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DIRECT AND INDIRECT BELIEF
Curtis Brown
I
The word 'belief' is ambiguous, referring sometimes to what is believed,
sometimes to the act or state of believing it. I believe that as I write this
it is sunny outside. This belief is true. What is true is what I believe,
namely that it is sunny, not my believing it. On the other hand, my
belief that it is sunny is rational and unshakeable, and it played a causal
role in my deciding not to wear a coat today. What is rational,
unshakeable, and played a causal role is my believing a certain thing,
not the thing I believe. I will say that what I believe is an object of belief,
and that my believing it is a belief state.
There is a parallel distinction between perceptual states and objects of
perception. If Agnes sees an Angus, then one object of her perception is
a cow, and she herself is in one of the perceptual states which can be
gotten into by looking at a cow. If I say, "Agnes sees an Angus," then I
am conveying two sorts of information: information about Agnes'
perceptual state, and information about the object of her perception. In
ascriptions of belief, too, we convey information both about the
believer's state and about the object of his or her belief.1
I take the moral of much-discussed examples due to Tyler Burge and
Saul Kripke to be that the relation between one's belief state and what
one believes is rather loose: one could be in the same belief state but
have different objects of belief, and one can have the same objects of
belief in virtue of being in different belief states (with qualifications to
be noted later). In section II I explain why.
I then suggest, following my paper "What is a Belief State?"2 that one's
being in a particular belief state is nevertheless best characterized by a
set of propositions, namely those one would believe in any situation in

which one were in that belief state.3 I describe these propositions as
one's immediate objects of belief. Many of the things we believe are not
immediate objects of belief in this sense. So there is a distinction
between two sorts of belief: one directly believes the propositions that
are one's immediate objects of belief, and indirectly believes the rest of
the propositions one believes.
My main purpose in this paper is to develop and defend this distinction
between direct and indirect belief. In section III, I sketch the nature and
fill in some of the content of an account according to which our direct
beliefs together with our circumstances determine the rest of our beliefs.
Finally, in section IV, I apply the account to some puzzles about belief.
I begin by characterizing belief states and objects of belief. The facts that
determine what one believes may be divided into facts about the
believer, on the one hand, and facts about the believer's environment,
on the other. One's belief state consists of those facts solely about the
believer that help determine what he or she believes. Being in a certain
belief state is thus an intrinsic, nonrelational property of an individual.4
The objects of our belief are the things we believe, just as the objects of
perception are the things we perceive and the objects of desire are the
things we want. What one believes may be true or false, depending on
the way things are. So the objects of belief must be such that they have
truth values, and such that they would have truth values, not
necessarily the same ones, in various possible situations other than the
actual one. An object of belief, then, must be something which
determines a function from possible situations to truth values. So the
simplest possible answer to the question what the objects of belief are is
that they simply are the relevant functions.5 I shall, in accordance with
one modern tradition, use the term 'proposition' to mean such a
function; the simple answer to the question about the objects of belief is
then that they are propositions.6
Let us assume, then, that the objects of belief are propositions. Then the
question arises, which propositions? Consider the following brief
dialogue. "John believes that fluoridation is a communist plot." "What
did you say he believes?" "That fluoridation is a communist plot." This
reasonably natural short conversation seems to imply that there is
something which John believes, and that this something is that

fluoridation is a communist plot. 'That fluoridation is a communist plot'
appears to be a singular term denoting what John believes. I propose to
take this appearance at face value. So I will suppose that if 'x believes
that S' is true, and proposition P = that S, then P is an object of x's
belief.7 I will further suppose that 'that S' denotes P (in a context) just in
case S expresses P (in that context).
I have described the nature of belief states so briefly because I have
discussed the issue in greater detail elsewhere. I have discussed the
nature of the objects of belief so briefly because for my purposes here
not much hinges on the details of an account of these objects. Different
views about the nature of propositions, or about the semantics of belief
sentences, would force reformulations of the points I will make, and for
some purposes this could be very important: but the outlines of the case
for the distinction between direct and indirect belief should be mostly
independent of such details.
II
I take the moral of much recent writing on the propositional attitudes to
be that belief states and many of the objects of belief are only
contingently related. Many of the objects of an individual's belief do not
characterize the belief state he or she is in essentially. This is because the
belief states one is in supervene on one's intrinsic properties, while one
has many of the objects of belief one does partly in virtue of facts about
one's environment. One is in a given belief state independent of what
situation one finds oneself in, except to the extent that the situation
directly affects one's intrinsic properties; but one has many of the
objects of one's belief only by virtue of the situation one is in.
I will consider two much-discussed examples which illustrate this point
in different ways. The first example is due to Tyler Burge,8 the second
to Saul Kripke.9 The examples are by now so familiar that I will spend
little space on their details or variations.
In order to explain as clearly as possible what Burge's and Kripke's
examples show, I need to introduce several notions. First, we need to
distinguish between one's total object of belief and partial objects of
belief. The total object of one's belief is simply the collection of all
propositions which are objects of one's belief. Partial objects of one's

belief are any objects of belief short of the total object of one's belief.
When we speak of objects of belief, we typically mean partial objects of
belief.
One's total belief state, then, is what Daniel Dennett calls the
"organismic contribution" to one's total object of belief.10 It is not clear
whether there are also partial belief states. Let us call particularism the
view that for any partial object of belief there is a partial belief state not
identical with one's total belief state which is the complete organismic
contribution to one's having that particular object. Particularism is
opposed to holism, the view that one has any partial object of belief only
in virtue of being in a total belief state: the view that belief states cannot
be decomposed into parts. There are also intermediate views: for
instance the view that some of our beliefs are "explicitly represented" or
"core" beliefs, and that each proposition explicitly represented
corresponds to a partial belief state, while obvious consequences of
these beliefs, though still beliefs, do not have corresponding partial
belief states.11
Now, let us call the following view the Total Necessary Connection
View:
For any total belief state S, and for any total object of belief O, if
one is in S and has O as one's total object of belief, then of
necessity one is in S if and only if one has O as one's total object of
belief.
We could also express this as the view that, for any total belief state S
and any total object of belief O, if one is in S and has O as one's total
object of belief, then in any possible situation in which one is in S one
has O as one's total object of belief, and in any possible situation in
which one has O as one's total object of belief one is in S. Or again, we
could say that if one's total belief state is fixed, then one's total object of
belief is also fixed, and if one's total object of belief is fixed, then what
total belief state one is in is also fixed.
The Total Necessary Connection View divides into two sub-claims. The
first I will call the claim of essential characterization:

If one is in a total belief state S and has O as one's total object of
belief, then of necessity if one is in S then one has O as one's total
object of belief.
That is, in any possible situation in which one is in S, one has O as one's
total object of belief; fixing the state suffices to fix the object. I call this
the claim of essential characterization because it amounts to the claim
that determining a certain total object of belief is an essential
characteristic of a belief state.
The second sub-claim, the other half of the original biconditional,
is the claim of complete characterization: If one is in a total belief
state S and has O as one's total object of belief, then of necessity if
one has O as one's total object of belief then one is in S.
If the claim of complete characterization is correct then in any situation
in which one has the total object of belief one in fact has, one will also be
in the total belief state one is in fact in; fixing the object suffices to fix the
state.
If the particularist view that there are partial belief states is correct, then
there are stronger versions of both parts of the Necessary Connection
View. There is the strengthened claim of essential characterization,
which holds that if one has a proposition as partial object of one's belief
in virtue of being in a corresponding partial belief state, then of
necessity if one is in that partial belief state one has that proposition as
partial object of one's belief. And similarly there is the strengthened
claim of complete characterization, which holds that if one has a
proposition as partial object of one's belief in virtue of being in a
corresponding partial belief state, then of necessity if one has that
proposition as partial object of one's belief then one is in that partial
state. However, Burge's example shows that the claim of essential
characterization is false, and thus also that the strengthened claim of
essential characterization is false. Kripke's example shows that the
strengthened claim of complete characterization is false, but not that the
weaker claim of complete characterization is false. Let us briefly
consider these two examples.
Hilary Putnam has argued that meanings "ain't in the head."12 Burge's
argument is very similar to Putnam's; it may be understood as an

attempt to show that beliefs are not in the head either. Burge asks us to
consider someone of whom we would normally say that he believes that
he has arthritis in his thigh. The individual--let us call him 'Art'--has
learned English in the normal way and is now a competent English
speaker; he has certain pains in his thigh which are in fact due to a
rheumatoid ailment; and as a result of these pains he assents to the
sentence "I have arthritis in my thigh." In such a situation it seems
correct to say that Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh--even
though, as Burge points out, it is in fact impossible to get arthritis in the
thigh.
Call this situation "Situation 1". Now we are to imagine a counterfactual
situation, Situation 2. In this second situation, Art is exactly the same as
in Situation 1. Every episode in his history of language learning is the
same, and he himself is in every intrinsic or nonrelational respect no
different than in Situation 1. But his linguistic community is different: in
Situation 2, 'arthritis' refers in Art's community not to arthritis but to
rheumatoid ailments more generally. It refers, I will say, not to arthritis
but to "arthritis". (The quotation marks here are scare quotes.) Now it
seems that speakers in Situation 2 can correctly say "Art believes that he
has arthritis in his thigh." But they do not mean by that sentence what
we would mean by it. What they mean is rather that he believes he has
"arthritis" in his thigh. Burge claims, plausibly, that in Situation 2 Art
does not believe that he has arthritis in his thigh. He believes that he has
"arthritis" in his thigh, but that is a belief in a different proposition.
Before considering what conclusions to draw from Burge's example, let
us pause to consider whether the example should be taken at face value.
A natural response to the example is to assert that in Situation 1 Art
does not, despite appearances, believe that he has arthritis in his thigh.
Kent Bach has argued for this conclusion along the following lines.13
Art does not associate the concept of arthritis with the term 'arthritis'. But
assenting to the sentence "I have arthritis in my thigh" is not evidence
that one has a belief about arthritis unless one associates the term
'arthritis' with the concept of arthritis. So we have no reason to think Art
believes he has arthritis in his thigh. (Burge invites this sort of criticism
by claiming that Art has the concept of arthritis, and associates it with
'arthritis', but incompletely understands the concept. Bach finds the
notion of an incompletely understood concept mysterious, and suggests

that we should say instead that Art associates with 'arthritis'
a different concept which he does completely understand.)
There are two main responses to be made here. First: Burge's example
can be presented without making use of any views about concepts. (In
particular, the example does not depend on Burge's view that one can
possess a concept one incompletely understands.) The intuition which
supports the view that Art believes he has arthritis in his thigh is rather
strong, and is elicited by the bare description of Situation 1, without the
aid of philosophical theories or technical notions. The notion of a
concept, by contrast, has very little pretheoretical content. As far as I can
see, the ordinary notion of concept permits any of the following views:
(i) Art associates the concept of arthritis with the term 'arthritis', but
incompletely understands this concept (Burge's view). (ii) Art associates
with the term 'arthritis' a concept he does completely understand, but
which is not the concept of arthritis. (Bach's view--but note that even on
this view we could allow that Art believes he has arthritis in his thigh, by
rejecting the idea that having the concept of arthritis is a necessary
condition for having beliefs about arthritis. Similarly, we might want to
allow that Fido believes his bone is buried in the back yard while
denying that Fido possesses the concept of bone.) (iii) Art fully
understands the concept of arthritis, and associates it with the term
'arthritis', but the concept of arthritis does not determine the extension
of 'arthritis'. (Putnam may hold something like this view.) (iv) There is
no such thing as "the concept of arthritis," just the disease, a term that
denotes it, and various degrees of competence in the use of this term.
(Someone sceptical of the analytic-synthetic distinction might well hold
this view.)
If the ordinary notion of concept will not decide between such
possibilities, Bach must be seen as advancing a theoretical account of
the notion of a concept, and utilizing this account to counter a fairly
strong linguistic intuition. This need not be a hopeless task, but at a
minimum Bach's theory of concepts needs to be more fully described
and motivated before it will give us grounds to reject the strong reaction
that Art does believe he has arthritis in his thigh.14
This brings me to the second response. Were a theory of concepts with
the consequence that Art does not believe he has arthritis in his thigh to
be developed, it seems likely that its consequences would be

unacceptably sceptical. Bach concedes that we would normally say that
Art believes this, and even that Art himself, once apprised of his
mistake, would continue to assert that he had believed he had arthritis in
his thigh. Moreover, Burge has persuasively argued that avery wide
range of examples can be utilized to make the same point as the arthritis
example. So it appears that Bach's view will involve rejecting, not just a
few isolated intuitions, but a very great deal of what we would
ordinarily say about people's beliefs.15
I shall, then, continue to take Burge's example at face value. The moral
of the example, I suggest, is that the objects of a person's belief are not
fully determined by that person's intrinsic properties. The argument for
this conclusion is simple. We have seen that in Situation 1, Art believes
that he has arthritis in his thigh, and that in Situation 2, it is not the case
that Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. From these facts
together with my remarks in section I about the objects of belief, it
follows that there is a proposition which is an object of Art's belief in
Situation 1 but not in Situation 2. And from this intermediate conclusion
together with the point that in both situations all the intrinsic,
nonrelational facts about Art are the same, it follows that the intrinsic,
nonrelational facts about Art do not fully determine what the objects of
his belief are. What belief state Art is in is an intrinsic, nonrelational fact
about him. So the example shows that the claim of essential
characterization is false, and therefore also that the strengthened claim
of essential characterization is false.
We can put the conclusion of the argument in a suggestive way by
introducing the notion of an immediate object of belief. It seems natural
to say that in some sense, if Art is exactly the same in Situations 1 and 2,
then he must believe exactly the same things in both situations. Burge's
example shows that the sense in which this is true cannot be the
ordinary one. But we can capture this somewhat special sense of
believing as follows. Let us say that a proposition is an immediate
object of Art's belief only if whether he has it is fully determined by the
intrinsic, nonrelational facts about him. And let us say that
Art directly believes that P if and only if the proposition that P is an
immediate object of his belief. Then Burge has shown that many of the
objects of our belief are not immediate objects of our belief, that is, that
many of the things we believe are things we believe only indirectly. We

might say that he has shown that a sort of naive realism about belief
cannot be correct.
I have intentionally adapted this terminology from the philosophy of
perception. It is illuminating to consider Burge's result about the objects
of belief in light of similar considerations about the objects of
perception. It is enlightening and somehow liberating to find that the
intrinsic facts about someone do not determine what the objects of his
or her belief are. But it can also seem unpalatable and disturbing, and to
alleviate this reaction it may be helpful to notice how obvious the parallel
fact about perception is. For who would have thought that the intrinsic
facts about me determine what the objects of my perception are? To take
a classic example, suppose that I see a tomato, and thus that I have a
tomato as object of my perception. Clearly there is a wide variety of
possible situations in which the intrinsic facts about me are exactly the
same and yet in which the object of my perception is very different: I
could have been looking at a wax imitation of an apple, or at half an
apple, or at a cleverly positioned photograph of an apple, or perhaps
even at nothing at all, if my brain were being stimulated in the way it
would be by seeing an apple. The intrinsic facts about me are not
sufficient to determine what the objects of my perception are.
It seems clear that in some sense the subject sees exactly the same thing
in all of these situations. After all, the situations are perceptually
indistinguishable for him; he has exactly the same visual experiences in
all of them; in all of them he is in the same perceptual state. If we say
that an object is an immediate object of perception only if the intrinsic
facts about the observer determine what the object is, and that one
directly perceives an object just in case it is an immediate object of one's
perception, then such examples show that one may indirectly perceive
different objects in situations in which exactly the same objects are
directly perceived.16
Perceptual ascriptions characterize states of the head only indirectly, by
saying what one of the mediate objects of someone's perception is. I
suggest that something directly analogous is true of belief ascriptions:
they typically characterize belief states only indirectly, by saying what
one of the mediate objects of someone's belief is. I will elaborate on this
point later.

I turn now to Kripke's example, which I will use to illustrate a point in
some ways the converse of Burge's example. (Kripke's own use of his
example is rather different; I will discuss it briefly in section IV.) The
example goes roughly as follows.17
Pierre is a normal French speaker who knows no English. He has heard,
in French, of London, called by the French 'Londres', and on the basis of
what he has heard he thinks that it is pretty, so he assents to the French
sentence 'Londres est jolie'. It seems correct to conclude from this that
Pierre believes that London is pretty. Later, Pierre moves to an
unattractive part of London--without knowing that the city he is in is
the city called by him 'Londres'. He learns English by the direct method,
until ultimately he is as competent in the language as his English
neighbors. He calls the city he lives in 'London', and thinks it very
unattractive; so he assents to 'London is not pretty'. It seems correct to
conclude that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. But Pierre still
assents to 'Londres est jolie': he is unaware that 'Londres' and 'London'
denote the same city. So Pierre believes that London is pretty, and
Pierre believes that London is not pretty. These are inconsistent beliefs,
and yet it seems unfair to accuse Pierre of inconsistency, since "he lacks
information, not logical acumen."
This example shows, though a little indirectly, that one may have a
given proposition as (partial) object of one's belief in virtue of being in
different (partial) states. Pierre entertains the same proposition--that
London is pretty--positively in virtue of being in one partial belief state,
and negatively in virtue of being in a different partial belief state. That
the two states result in his taking opposite attitudes toward this
proposition shows that they are distinct states.
The example will more clearly illustrate my point if we suppose that
Pierre actually moved to a lovely part of London and came to accept the
sentence 'London is pretty'. Now Pierre believes twice over that London
is pretty. Either the partial belief state he entered in France or the one he
entered in England would by itself have resulted in his believing that
London is pretty. And he could have entered either of these partial
states without entering the other. Let us then imagine two possible
situations. In S1 Pierre learns in France to accept 'Londres est jolie', but
never moves to England. In S2 Pierre learns nothing of London in
France, but does move to London and there comes to accept 'London is

pretty'. In each situation Pierre is in a partial belief state which he is not
in in the other; thus Pierre's total belief state is different in S1 than in S2.
And yet in both situations he has the proposition that London is pretty
as an object of his belief.
This example shows that the sentence 'Pierre believes that London is
pretty' does not characterize Pierre as being in any particular partial
belief state. It characterizes him only as being in some one of the many
partial belief states in virtue of which he could have the proposition that
London is pretty as an object of his belief. It thus shows that the
strengthened claim of complete characterization is false: fixing a partial
object of belief does not suffice to fix a partial belief state.
It is natural to wonder whether Kripke's example can be strengthened
so as to show that even the weaker complete characterization claim is
false: so as to show that one could have the same total object of belief in
virtue of being in different total belief states. I believe that the example
cannot be strengthened in this way. If all of someone's objects of belief
are fixed, that is enough to fix one's total belief state. S1 and S2 are
situations in which Pierre is in different total belief states and yet in
which one of the partial objects of his belief is the same. But there are
other partial objects of his belief which are different in the two
situations. For instance, in S1 Pierre believes that the sentence 'Londres
est jolie' is true, and thus has as a partial object of his belief the
proposition that the sentence 'Londres est jolie' is true. But in S2 Pierre
does not have this proposition as a partial object of belief. And I suspect
that what is true in this example will be true in general: we will not be
able to construct an example in which Pierre is in different total belief
states in two situations and yet has all the same objects of belief in the
two situations.
Our conclusion so far is that there is a rather loose fit between belief
states and objects of belief. Either can change independently of the
other. But my last paragraph already suggests that there may be limits
to this looseness and independence. I would suggest that there is a part
or subset of one's total object of belief, namely one's
total immediate object of belief, which really does characterize one's belief
state essentially and completely, about which the Necessary Connection
View is correct.

I define the immediate objects of belief as those propositions one not
only believes, but would believe no matter how much different one's
situation were, provided that one were in the very same belief state.
(Remember that having all the same intrinsic properties, physical and
phenomenological and whatever others there might be, is sufficient for
being in the same belief state.) Having so defined the immediate objects
of belief I guarantee that one's total immediate object of belief
characterizes one's belief state essentially, that is, that one's total
immediate object of belief will be the same whenever one's belief state is
the same.
Of course, I cannot guarantee by definition that there are any immediate
objects of belief. Why should we think that there are? I can provide only
a schematic defense of this view here. I have three main reasons for
supposing that there are immediate objects of belief, objects of belief
which characterize one's belief state essentially. First: it seems clear that
one's belief state provides a way of ordering a wide range of possible
worlds. (Here I loosely follow Daniel Dennett.18) Given one's belief
state, one is better suited to some worlds than to others: in some one's
expectations are better met, and actions designed to satisfy one's desires
more likely to do so, than in others. In particular, then, drawing a line
somewhere, we may say that one's belief state determines the set of
worlds to which one is best suited, and we can describe a belief state in
terms of the worlds it determines in this way. On the view I am
provisionally adopting, a set of worlds is a proposition. So it looks as
though there must be a proposition which characterizes one's belief state
essentially. Second: the intrinsic properties of an individual (or at least
some of them, those captured by one's belief state) clearly play some
sort of important role in determining what one believes. But what sort of
role? If the relevant intrinsic properties are characterized semantically,
in terms of things believed, it is easy to see how one's intrinsic states
could combine in a principled way with one's context to yield the
objects of one's belief; in the next section I will provide some candidates
for the principles involved. But if one's intrinsic properties cannot be
characterized intentionally, then it becomes very difficult to see how
they determine what one believes.19 Third: there are some purposes for
which objects of belief are essential, but for which mediate objects of
belief will not serve. An account of the rationality of belief, for example,
must be an account of the rationality of what is believed; we lose our grip

on the notion of rationality if we talk about mental states in physical or
syntactic terms. But examples like that of Kripke's Pierre, discussed in
section IV, suggest that indirect objects of belief may always obscure the
reasonableness of the mental states we are in. If we need to evaluate the
rationality of belief in terms of the objects of belief, and cannot reliably
do so in terms of mediate objects of belief, this gives us reason to think
that there are immediate objects of belief. (I do not expect this brief
defense of the existence of immediate objects of belief to be persuasive
to the unconverted, but at least it suggests the lines along which I would
hope to develop a fuller defense.)
I now propose, first, to explain how one's mediate objects of belief are
determined by one's immediate objects of belief plus context and,
second, to put the resulting distinction between direct and indirect
belief to work in thinking about some puzzles.
III
In section II, we considered the case of Art and his belief that he has
arthritis in his thigh. In the articles in which he presents this and related
examples, Tyler Burge draws from them the very general conclusion
that no "individualistic" theory of the mental can be correct--that is, that
no theory can account for such mental states as belief in terms solely of
intrinsic properties of the subject. And Burge counts among
individualistic theories Cartesianism, central-state materialism, and
functionalism.
Burge's example does indeed show that there is no true lawlike
generalization of the form Art believes P iff C(Art), where C(Art) is a
purely intrinsic characterization of Art. For there are at least some, and
probably very many, replacements for P such that no matter what
intrinsic characterization we fill in for C(Art), there will be possible
situations in which C(Art) but Art does not believe P. The example
shows this in particular for the case in which P is the proposition that
Art has arthritis in his thigh.
It is important to see that this sort of account is impossible. But this
result need not be especially disturbing to functionalists or advocates of
any of the other individualistic views Burge mentions. Compare the
case of weight. An individualistic account of what weight I have is

impossible, since I could have a very different weight even though all
the intrinsic facts about me were exactly the same--if, for instance, I
were on the moon instead of in Texas. But it is possible to give an
individualistic account of that property of mine in virtue of which I
have the weight I do, namely my mass, and then to give a very general
account of what weight anyone with a given mass will have in any
situation. It is my hope that the objects of belief are analogous to
weights, and that beliefs themselves are analogous to masses; if so we
may be able to give an individualistic account of what belief states one
is in, and then give a general account of what the objects of belief will be
in various circumstances of anyone who is in one of those belief
states.20
On this view, a full theory of belief should consist of an individualistic
and a non-individualistic part. The individualistic part would be an
account of belief states or of direct or immediate belief. It would have
this form:
Art directly believes P iff C(Art),
where, as before, C(Art) is a purely intrinsic characterization of Art. The
remaining component of a full theory would have this form:
Art believes Q in S iff there is a P such that
Art directly believes P and R(S,P,Q)
where S is a situation and R(S,P,Q) is some relation whereby the
proposition which Art directly believes and the situation he finds
himself in together determine the proposition he mediately or indirectly
believes.
In "What is a Belief State?" I said a little, though hardly enough, about
what sort of characterization C(Art) might be. In the present section I
will try to say something about what sort of relation R(S,P,Q) might be.
If I could completely characterize this relation, then I would have
presented an explicit definition of belief in terms of direct belief. But it
will be convenient to aim toward such a definition one clause at a time. I
will here suggest what some of the needed clauses might look like. We
want to know the conditions under which someone believes Q, for any
proposition Q; I will suggest some such conditions but not all.

A first clause is obvious:
(1) If x directly believes Q, then x believes
Q in any situation.
Notice that in such principles as this I am presupposing that 'Art
believes that S' is true just in case the proposition expressed by S is an
object of Art's belief. If this view is too simplistic, then my quantifying
over Q in 'x believes Q' is illegitimate; in that case principles like (1)
would have to be modified in one of two ways. We might make them
partial truth conditions for belief sentences, so that (1) would become
something like (1'): If Q is an immediate object of x's belief, and S
expresses Q, then 'x believes that S' is true. Or we might just provide a
theory of the mediate objects of belief and then leave it an open question
how the truth conditions of 'x believes that S' are related to the mediate
objects of x's belief. In that case (1) would become something like (1''): If
Q is an immediate object of x's belief, then Q is a mediate object of x's
belief.
A second needed principle is one which says, roughly, how de re belief
depends on de dicto belief in conjunction with circumstances. More
precisely, we need a principle which says how belief in a general
proposition can in conjunction with circumstances result in belief in a
singular proposition. De re belief has been the focus of a great deal of
attention since Quine's early discussions of "quantifying in," and I have
nothing novel to say on the subject. But I will borrow from David
Lewis's account of de re belief21 to show what role such an account will
play in the theory of belief I envision. Lewis's account gives rise, in the
present context, to a clause something like this:
If x directly believes the proposition that the
F is G, and F is solely a relation of acquaintance
to x, and, in situation S, the F = y, then,
in S, x believes the proposition that y is G.
Notice that this principle does not imply that one can believe a singular
proposition only by virtue of believing a general proposition. To use the
familiar (but misleading) terms, the principle does not imply that all de
re belief is reducible to de dicto belief. I am inclined to believe (to put it

crudely) that de re beliefs are always had by virtue of having de se beliefs,
but that de se beliefs are not always had by virtue of having de
dicto beliefs. But I need not defend this view here.
To see how the principle works, consider the familiar case of
someone, x, who believes the general proposition that the tallest spy is a
spy. Suppose that in x's situation the tallest spy is Fred. Does the above
principle direct us to attribute to x belief in the singular proposition that
Fred is a spy? Clearly not. F in this case is 'tallest spy', and whether is
acquainted with Fred is irrelevant to whether Fred is the tallest spy.
Now consider a case in which x is standing in front of Fred and staring
at him. Suppose that x forms the general belief, 'The person I see and
who looks like this is a spy'. It seems clear that in this case x does believe
that Fred is a spy, and our principle endorses this. F is 'person x sees
who looks like this'--a property which is a relation of acquaintance to x.
Problems lurk just beneath the surface here, and the term 'solely' is
intended to meet them.22 For consider this case: suppose I saw two
people this morning--first Adams, then Bates. I believe that the first
person I saw this morning is a spy (and that the second is not). I also
believe that the first person I saw this morning is bald. I infer that the
spy I saw this morning is bald. But in fact, unknown to me, Adams
is not a spy while Bates is. It seems clear that in this case I do not believe
that Bates is bald in virtue of believing that the spy I saw this morning is
bald. But I believe that the spy I saw this morning is bald, 'spy I saw this
morning' is a relation of acquaintance with me, and the spy I saw this
morning is Bates. The crucial point here is that 'spy I saw this morning'
is a property which involves not only a relation of acquaintance but
more as well. My seeing something is a relation of acquaintance
between me and the thing, but something's being a spy is not. So F is
not solely a relation of acquaintance to x.
This example raises interesting issues about how to identify properties
which are entirely relations of acquaintance. This seems to be difficult
even in cases of direct visual perception, which one would expect to be
among the easiest cases. For example, the Muller-Lyer arrow illusion
shows that two lines of the same length can be made to appear to be of
different lengths. One can even modify the illusion to make the shorter
of two lines appear to be the longer. So a predicate like 'longest line I

see' will not be a suitable F, on pain of counterexamples exactly parallel
to the Adams-Bates example. (How about 'line which appears to me to
be longest'? This seems to mean something like 'x such that x is a line
and I believe that x is longer than any other line I see.' But this already
attributes to me a de re belief about the line in question, and the
conditions under which we have de re beliefs are precisely what our
principle is supposed to explain. How about 'thing which
produces these sensations in me'? This sort of description does not
sufficiently discriminate between the many causes of my perceptual
experiences. And anyway it is not a property nothing could have unless
I were acquainted with it: perhaps I am a brain in a vat, and all my
sensations are produced by a mad scientist. I need not be acquainted
with the mad scientist in the relevant sense.) No doubt being the longest
line I see mixes an acquaintance relation with something else. But it is
very difficult to see how to cut away the "something else" and have
enough left to provide a suitable F. But I cannot pause to pursue this
issue here.
I turn now to a third clause which has a metalinguistic element. In order
to see the motivation for this clause, let us look yet again at Burge's
example. We know that Art does not directly believe that he has
arthritis in his thigh, since he is in exactly the same belief state in
Situations 1 and 2 but believes that he has arthritis in his thigh only in
Situation 1. Call the proposition that Art has arthritis in his thigh 'Q'.
Any immediate object of Art's belief is a proposition he believes in both
situations. We need a principle which tells us, for some proposition P,
that anyone who believes P in Situation 1 believes Q in Situation 1, but
which does not tell us the same thing about Situation 2. The principle
has to be sensitive to the difference between Situations 1 and 2.
But the only difference between Situations 1 and 2 in Burge's example is
a difference in the speech practices of other members of Art's linguistic
community, and as a result a difference in the meaning of the term
'arthritis'. Since the only relevant difference between the two situations
is a linguistic one, the desired principle has to appeal to linguistic facts.
It will have to look something like this: If Art directly believes P, and
'arthritis' means arthritis, then Art believes that he has arthritis in his
thigh. Any such principle will clearly be silly unless P itself has
something to do with the term 'arthritis'.

Now Art does in fact have beliefs about the term 'arthritis' which hold
constant across Situations 1 and 2. In particular, he believes that he has
the disease called 'arthritis' in his thigh. And, given that Art is a normal
English speaker, it seems plausible that it is in virtue of this
metalinguistic belief that Art believes in Situation 1 that he has arthritis
in his thigh and in Situation 2 that he has "arthritis" in his thigh. After
all, what else could be responsible for these beliefs?
Art's case can be accounted for by this principle: If Art immediately
believes that he has the disease called 'arthritis' in his thigh, and is a
competent user of the term 'arthritis', and in situation S 'arthritis' means
arthritis, then, in S, Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh.
Somewhat more generally, we may say this:
(3) If Art believes that a sentence R is true, and Art is a competent
user of R, and, in situation S, R expresses proposition Q, then, in
S, Art believes Q.
In Situation 1 the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his thigh', or the sentence
'I have arthritis in my thigh' as uttered by Art, expresses the proposition
that Art has arthritis in his thigh; in Situation 2 the same sentence
expresses the different proposition that Art has "arthritis" in his thigh;
so the principle yields the results we need for the two situations. Note
that competence admits of degrees: there are speakers of Art's language
more competent than he in the use of 'arthritis'. The competence
required for the principle is whatever minimal competence one needs in
order for a sentence to be said to be part of one's language, or in order
for one to be able to use the sentence to express or assert the proposition
it expresses in one's linguistic community. If one understands an
expression, one is a competent user of it, but perhaps not conversely;
perhaps for instance Art's minimal competence in the use of 'arthritis'
does not suffice for understanding.
It is worth pausing to see that the present principle is not vulnerable to
certain obvious objections to other sorts of metalinguistic account. The
principle does not have the consequence that all we really have beliefs
about are sentences. Art's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is not
about a sentence, although the deeper belief in virtue of which he
believes this is. Nor does the principle have the consequence that we
have all our nonlinguistic beliefs in virtue of deeper metalinguistic

beliefs. Although Art's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is
mediated by a metalinguistic belief, his belief that he is hungry very
likely is not.
The principle also does not have the consequence that apparently
object-level belief ascriptions really ascribe metalinguistic beliefs. The
sentence 'Art believes that he has arthritis in his thigh' does not ascribe
to Art belief in the proposition that the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his
thigh' is true. We have a different sentence to perform that task, namely
the sentence 'Art believes that the sentence "Art has arthritis in his
thigh" is true.' And since the principle is not part of an analysis of belief
sentences or ascriptions, it is not subject to counterexamples involving
translation.
Burge reports that one common reaction to his case is to deny that
Art really believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. He really believes, it
is claimed, only that the sentence 'Art has arthritis in his thigh' is true.
Burge responds that Art may well have that metalinguistic belief, but
that he also clearly has the object-level belief. On this point I agree with
Burge. My point is just that Art has the object-level belief in virtue of
believing that 'Art has arthritis in his thigh' is true. If he had no
metalinguistic beliefs about the term 'arthritis', he would not have the
object-level belief either.
A fourth element in our account of the relation between mediate and
immediate belief is suggested by a consideration of the lottery paradox,
which initially seems to provide an objection to a view I will briefly
defend in section IV, namely that we believe all the logical
consequences of our immediate beliefs.23 Suppose I know of a lottery
with a thousand tickets. It seems that I might well immediately believe,
of any of those tickets, that it will not win. (If I cannot immediately
believe that, I can at least immediately believe that the sentence
'Ticket i will not win' is true, and this will give rise to the same
difficulty.) But I have no special information about that particular ticket,
so if I can immediately believe that it will not win I should be able to
believe this of each of the tickets; that is, I should be able to immediately
believe that ticket 1 will not win, that ticket 2 will not win, . . . , and that
ticket 1,000 will not win. But then, since I believe all the consequences of
my immediate beliefs, I believe that ticket 1 will not win and ticket 2
will not win and . . . and ticket 1,000 will not win. If I also believe that

tickets 1 through 1,000 are all the tickets there are, then I immediately
believe that no ticket will win. But I don't believe that, immediately or
otherwise. So some premise of the argument must have been mistaken,
and it seems natural to pick on the one that says I believe all the
conjunctions of things I immediately believe.
Natural but mistaken. We should instead reject the view that I believe
immediately that ticket i will not win. I immediately believe only
propositions true in all the worlds to which I am best suited, and I am
just as well suited to some world in which ticket i wins as to any world
in which it does not. So I do not immediately believe that ticket i will not
win.24
Although I do not immediately believe that ticket i will not win, very
likely I do, in the ordinary way, believe that it will not win.25 There
must, then, be some principle which gets me from what I immediately
believe to the mediate belief that ticket i will not win. None of the
principles so far discussed will accomplish this, so there must be
another.
I suggest the following:
(4) If P is true in more than n percent of the worlds in which
my total immediate object of belief is true, then I
(mediately) believe that P.
I leave the value of n unfixed; presumably it will vary with context.
Notice that even if there are infinitely many worlds in which my total
immediate object of belief is true and ticket i wins, and infinitely many
more in which my total immediate object of belief is true and
ticket i does not win, this should not lead to difficulty in computing
percentages. There are just as many even positive integers as positive
integers; nevertheless half of the positive integers are even. Similarly,
99.9% of the worlds to which I am best suited are worlds in which
ticket i does not win.
I do, then, believe mediately that ticket 1 will not win, that ticket 2 will
not win, . . . , and that ticket 1,000 will not win. But we do not believe all
the conjunctions of things we mediately believe. And in particular it
seems unlikely that I believe the conjunction of all my beliefs that tickets
will not win. Certainly this conjunctive belief cannot be arrived at in the

same way the conjuncts were, since in none of the worlds to which I am
best suited is it true that no ticket wins.
If we had now specified all the conditions under which one believes
that Q, then we could add a final clause to the effect that under no other
conditions does one believe that Q; our "definition" or theory of belief
would then be complete. But there are surely conditions other than
those set forth here. For instance, our third clause appealed to the
notion of competence in the use of a sentence. Competence in the use of a
sentence presumably amounts to the belief that the sentence expresses a
certain proposition, in circumstances in which it does express that
proposition. This belief will usually be indirect. But it seems doubtful
that the conditions mentioned so far are enough to explain what
grounds these indirect beliefs. So I must leave this account of the way
direct belief determines indirect belief as an incomplete sketch.
IV
There are several puzzles about belief, cases in which powerful
considerations seem to support each of two inconsistent theses about
belief. I would suggest that in several such cases one of the theses is true
of direct belief, one of indirect belief; thus we can respect the intuitions
behind the apparently conflicting theses without contradiction. I will
discuss a few of these puzzles rather briefly; my aim is to suggest areas
in which the distinction I have been defending may be useful, not to
provide fully worked-out analyses of the puzzles.
Let us begin with Kripke's puzzle. The puzzle begins with the example
of Pierre, which in section II I modified to make a point of my own. The
puzzle is this: on the one hand, there is good reason to attribute to
Pierre inconsistent beliefs, beliefs which cannot be true together. Our
ordinary practices of belief ascription lead us to say that Pierre believes
that London is pretty (in virtue of accepting, and understanding,
'Londres est jolie'), and Pierre believes that London is not pretty (in virtue
of accepting, and understanding, 'London is not pretty'). These two
propositions are incompatible. On the other hand, we also seem to have
good reason not to ascribe incompatible beliefs to Pierre: he has made no
logical blunders, and cannot discover by introspection that his beliefs
cannot be true together. As Kripke puts it, it seems that we cannot
"convict Pierre of inconsistency."23

Convicting Pierre of inconsistency might involve one of two things:
showing that he has inconsistent beliefs, in the sense of 'objects of
belief', or showing that he deserves to be criticized for the belief state he
is in. Showing the former does not suffice to show the latter.
I suggest that we agree that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs in the first,
weak, sense. That is, he has two propositions as objects of his belief
which cannot be true together: the proposition that London is pretty,
and the proposition that London is not pretty. But the sting of
acknowledging this may be lessened by the recognition that these
propositions are not immediate objects of his belief, that they do not
characterize his belief state essentially. Pierre could be in exactly the
same belief state and yet not have inconsistent objects of belief--if for
instance there were a British city other than London which the French
called 'Londres', and it was this other city which Pierre had heard of as
'Londres' in France.26 That Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent is a result not
only of his belief state but also of facts about the world. But it would be
wrong to criticize Pierre for such facts as that 'Londres' names London
rather than some other city. If he were involved in inconsistencies
which stemmed only from his own belief state, then he should indeed
be criticized, but no such inconsistencies are involved in Kripke's
example.
Pierre believes that London is, and that it is not, pretty in virtue of a
variety of deeper beliefs, including the belief that the city called
'London' is not pretty and the belief that the city called 'Londres' is
pretty. If I am right then some such propositions, the immediate objects
of his belief, do characterize his belief state essentially; if they were
inconsistent then something would be seriously wrong with his belief
state. But the deeper beliefs by virtue of which Pierre has beliefs about
London are not inconsistent.
Kripke's puzzle is one of several reasons that have led various writers to
argue that we cannot rationally believe the impossible. I have argued
elsewhere that their reasons are not persuasive with respect to indirect
belief, but do give good grounds for thinking it cannot be the case that a
fully rational agent directly believes the impossible.27
Another puzzle is also due to Kripke. There are strong reasons for
supposing that any matter of contingent fact can be known only a

posteriori or with the aid of experience. But Kripke has provided
purported examples of contingent truths which can be known a priori.
What sort of thing can be known a priori? Knowledge we have a priori is
knowledge we have independently of experience. But not necessarily
independently of all experience: things we know solely in virtue of
knowing our language are generally considered to be known a
priori even though experience is required in order to come to know one's
language. We can construct a partial inventory of things known a
priori as follows: (i) If I know P solely in virtue of knowing my language,
then I know P a priori; (ii) If I know P a priori, and I know that P implies
Q, and I know Q, and I have come to believe Q on the basis of my
beliefs that P and that P implies Q, then I know Q a priori; (iii) Anything
I know solely in virtue of knowing things a priori is something I know a
priori.
An argument that we cannot know (nonlinguistic) matters of contingent
fact a priori might run like this: if a true proposition P is contingent, then
it is made true by some matter of fact. Now whenever I know a
proposition, what makes the proposition true must play a role in my
coming to believe it, so if I know that P then some matter of fact must
have played a role in my coming to believe P. I believe the things I do in
virtue of the belief state I am in. But the only way a matter of fact can
affect my belief state is by way of experience. So I cannot come to know
P independently of experience.28
But now consider the following purported example of a contingent
truth which we know a priori, taken from Fred Kroon:29 "If in the world
as it actually is the planets revolve around the sun, then the planets
revolve around the sun." I take this example rather Kripke's because it
seems to avoid criticisms which have been raised with regard to
Kripke's own examples.30 Kroon writes of this example that "it is
clearly a priori, for no one needs recourse to actual bits of experience to
know that if in the actual world the planets revolve around the Sun, then
is it true that they revolve around the sun. And it is contingent, for,
while true in the actual world, in worlds in which Ptolemaic astronomy
holds the consequent is false while the antecedent, being necessarily
true, is again true, leaving the entire proposition false at those worlds."

Once we distinguish between mediate and immediate objects of belief, I
would suggest, the apparent conflict between the argument and the
example disappears. The argument shows that we cannot
have direct or immediate a priori knowledge of contingent fact, while the
example establishes only the possibility of indirect or mediate a
priori knowledge of contingent fact.
Consider first the argument. The final premise is that the only way a
matter of fact can affect my belief state is by way of experience. Let us
suppose that this is correct. Nevertheless, while affecting my belief state
is the only way to affect what I directly believe, it is not the only way to
affect what I believe indirectly. A difference in my situation can make a
difference to what I believe without making any difference to my belief
state. In the case of indirect a priori knowledge of P, the necessary role of
extra linguistic fact in my believing P need not involve directly affecting
my belief state. So the argument shows that direct a priori knowledge of
contingent facts is impossible, but not that indirect a priori knowledge of
such facts is impossible.
The example does not conflict with the argument so understood. We
come to know the proposition that if the planets actually revolve
around the sun, they revolve around the sun, I suggest, as follows. We
know that for any sentence S, 'Actually S if and only if S' is true. We
know this simply in virtue of knowing English, so we know it a priori.
We similarly know a priori that 'The planets revolve around the sun' is a
sentence, and we know that these two facts imply that 'If the planets
actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun' is true: so
we also know a priori that this latter sentence is true. If we know the
language, we know a priori what this sentence means.
Now, all the a priori knowledge mentioned so far may well be direct,
but, given purely linguistic fact, none of it is contingent. (That
expressions mean what they do is a contingent matter, but, given that
they mean what they do, it is necessary for instance that 'Actually S iff S'
is true.) The next step is the one that gives us a priori knowledge of
contingent fact, but the knowledge resulting from this step is no longer
direct. For the next step is to apply clause (3) in the account of indirect
belief given in section III. Given that I believe that 'If the planets actually
revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun' is true, and
understand what it means, and given that it expresses the proposition

that if the planets actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around
the sun, clause (3) asserts that I also believe the proposition that if the
planets actually revolve around the sun, they revolve around the sun.
And, according to my partial inventory of a priori knowledge, this belief,
if it counts as knowledge, is knowledge a priori.
It must be admitted that indirect knowledge a priori is quite a weak
notion. If I believe a proposition indirectly, then there is a possible
world in which I am in the same belief state but do not believe that
proposition. Suppose things had been different: suppose that the
planets revolved around the sun, and I were in exactly the same belief
state I am in fact in, but something else were drastically different--that
China had only half as many people, say, or that our whole galaxy had
popped into existence fifty years ago. The proposition we are
considering would still have been true, but I would not have known it a
priori, in fact would not even have believed it. I would instead know a
priori a different proposition--the proposition expressed in that possible
world by the sentence 'If the planets actually revolve around the sun,
then they revolve around the sun'. It will rightly be felt that a
priori knowledge I would not have in some worlds in which the
proposition actually known remains true and I remain in the same belief
state is somehow lacking.
In addition to rejecting the traditional view that one cannot know
contingent truths a priori, Kripke has also rejected the view that we
cannot come to know necessary truths a posteriori. I have elsewhere
defended his rejection of this view, but have suggested that those
necessary truths we know a posteriori we typically also know a priori. I
have also suggested that we cannot come to directly believe a necessary
truth on the basis of a posteriori evidence.31
A third puzzle concerns belief and logical consequence. It seems
obvious that we do not believe all the logical consequences of things we
believe. For instance, we sometimes try to convince others of the truth
of propositions dear to us by showing them that the propositions in
question are logical consequences of things they already believe. But if
they believed all the logical consequences of things they believe, and the
proposition in question really followed from their beliefs, then it seems
they would believe it already and would need no convincing.

On the other hand, it can seem incredible that we could fail to believe all
the logical consequences of our beliefs, especially if we are committed to
the possible-worlds view of propositions. On this view, to believe a
proposition, say P, is to locate oneself as being in one of a set of possible
worlds, the set of worlds at which P is true. Now any logical
consequence of P, say P or Q, is true at a set of worlds which includes
the set at which P is true, so to believe P or Q is to locate oneself as
being in one of the worlds in the larger set. But surely if I have located
myself as being in one or other of the worlds in the smaller set, I have
already thereby located myself as being in one or other of the worlds in
any set which includes the smaller set! Or, to put the matter slightly
differently, the information that P includes the information that P or Q,
so if I have the information that P then I already have the information
that P or Q.32
I suggest tentatively that this puzzle is to be resolved as follows. We do
not believe all the logical consequences of things we believe. But we do
believe all the logical consequences of things we directly or immediately
believe.
I am inclined to regard direct belief as holistic--to suppose that at root
there is just one big immediate belief, roughly the proposition true at
those worlds to which one is best suited, and that one's partial
immediate objects of belief are just all the logical consequences of one's
total immediate object of belief. One's partial immediate objects of belief
may not have psychological reality in the way one's total immediate
object of belief does: it may be that the only way to say what someone's
partial immediate objects of belief are is by reference to that person's
total immediate object of belief. One's total immediate object of belief is
a seamless whole. One's total object of belief, on the other hand, is a
grab-bag or hodgepodge of propositions believed in various ways and
in virtue of different features of oneself and one's environment. The
grab-bag is not closed under logical implication, but the seamless whole
is.
It may be that talk of logical consequence in this context is misleading: it
may suggest incorrectly that the objects of belief are sentences. For
consider this account of what logical consequence is: Q is a logical
consequence of P just in case 'if P, then Q' is logically true; and this in
turn may mean that 'if P, then Q' is true solely in virtue of its (logical)

form. But if we understand logical consequence in this way we must
take P and Q to be sentences rather than propositions, since
propositions as I understand them have no form. They are just bits of
information or sets of worlds. In this sense of logical consequence,
beliefs do not have logical consequences.
There is a related notion, call it '*logical consequence', which does apply
to propositions. If we identify propositions with the sets of worlds in
which they are true, then proposition Q is a *logical consequence of
proposition P just in case P is a subset, not necessarily proper, of Q. Use
of this notion can easily be extended to sentences; sentence R is a
*logical consequence of sentence S just in case the proposition expressed
by R is a *logical consequence of the proposition ex-pressed by S. But
logical consequence and *logical consequence must be kept carefully
distinct: 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is a *logical consequence, but not a
logical consequence, of 'Hesperus is Hesperus'.
It may in part be confusion on this point which makes it seem so
obvious that we need not believe logical consequences of our beliefs.
Though our beliefs do not have logical consequences, some of our
beliefs are about sentences, which do. So when we say e.g. that someone
believes all the axioms of a formal system but not all the theorems, even
though the theorems are logical consequences of the axioms, we may
well be thinking of the axioms and theorems as sentences and have in
mind that he believes of all the axioms but not of all the theorems that
they are true. One can believe the necessary truth without believing, of
some sentence which expresses it, that the sentence is true.
These remarks may suggest the following objection to the view that we
believe all the *logical consequences of our immediate beliefs. I suppose
that we can directly believe that sentences are true. But then suppose
that I directly believe that the axioms of a system of logic are true and
that its rules of inference are correct. It seems that for any theorem, it is
a *logical consequence of my beliefs that the theorem is true, but it is
clear that I do not believe of all theorems that they are true. For
concreteness, let us take a very simple example. Suppose I were to
directly believe that 'Grass is green' is true, and that the rule of
inference: from Q, infer if P, then Q is correct. Then it would be a
*logical consequence of my direct beliefs that 'If the moon is square,
then grass is green' is true. Yet it seems that I could have the former

beliefs without the latter, and this will seem even clearer in more
complicated cases.
I would suggest in response that we need to look more closely at the
supposed direct belief that the rule of inference is correct. Just what is it
to believe that a rule of inference is correct? I suggest that in the present
case it comes to this: to believe that the rule is correct is to believe that
for any sentences R and S, if S is true then 'if R, then S' is true. My
tentative suggestion is that we cannot directly believe a generalization of
this sort unless we directly believe all its instances. I may be disposed to
work out proofs in accordance with the rule of inference, I may believe
that a sentence which expresses the proposition that it is a correct rule
of inference is true, I may indirectly believe that it is correct, but unless I
directly believe all its instances I do not directly believe that it is correct.
So the objection fails because the story it tells is incoherent.
Now suppose that I am correct in thinking that we believe all the
*logical consequences of our direct beliefs. It does not follow that we
believe all the *logical consequences of all the things we believe.
Consider again the case of Pierre. It is a *logical consequence of his
indirect beliefs that there is a city which is both pretty and not pretty.
Nevertheless he need not believe this, and no doubt does not. For
neither this proposition nor any other in virtue of which he could
believe it need be a *logical consequence of his direct beliefs, of for
instance his beliefs that 'Londres est jolie' is true and that 'London is not
pretty' is true.
We have now seen how Burge's and Kripke's examples show that most
of the objects of our belief are not immediate, and also why this does
not rule out the possibility that there are immediate objects of belief. We
have seen how a two-tiered conception of belief might go, a conception
in which we first explain how one's direct beliefs are determined by
one's intrinsic properties and then explain indirect belief in terms of
direct belief plus circumstances. And we have seen how the resulting
distinction between direct and indirect belief is of use in thinking about
some familiar puzzles. I hope this is enough to make the present sort of
account seem worth pursuing.33
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1. I will return to this helpful analogy between perception and belief. A
similar analogy is employed by John Perry, "The Problem of the
Essential Indexical," Nous 13 (1979): 3-21.
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certain property or set of properties; one's being in the belief state is
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4. More precisely, it is the property determined by the set of actual and
possible total intrinsic states which determine the same mapping from
possible situations to objects of belief as the individual's actual total
intrinsic state determines. See "What is a Belief State?" 358-62.
5. I am suggesting that an account of the objects of belief must include
an account of their truth conditions. For a related argument that an
account of the meaning of sentences must include truth conditions, see
Hartry Field, "Mental Representation," Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 9-61,
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and others which take propositions to be something sufficient to
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the account which takes propositions to be something like ordered n + 1tuples of an n-place property and n objects. Such an n + 1-tuple
determines a function from worlds to truth-values (T if in that world
the n objects have the n-place property, F otherwise), but also allows for
a distinction between e.g. the proposition that John = John and the
proposition that if John is tall then John is tall. For such an account see
especially Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1986).
7. The assumption that 'that S' is a singular term denoting the
proposition S expresses is rarely called into question. It is questioned by
Stephen Schiffer, in Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
But even Schiffer concedes that "the relational account of propositionalattitude verbs is the most plausible way of trying to make them square
with the assumption that natural languages have compositional

semantics" (181). Schiffer's rejection of the relational account of 'believes'
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